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The Very Brief History of
Decentralized Blockchain Governance
Michael Abramowicz*
ABSTRACT

A new form of blockchain governance involving the use of formal
games that incentivize participants to identify focal resolutions to
normative questions is emerging. This symposium contributionprovides
a brief survey of the literatureproposing and critiquing the use of such
mechanisms of decentralized decision-making, and it evaluates early
laboratoryand real-world experiments with this approach.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Merriam-Webster dictionary illustrates the phrase "slower
than molasses" with an example sentence about the workings of a
legislature.' However slow legislatures may be in developing new
legislation, the evolution of governance itself is far slower. It is a tribute
to the genius of their designers that our democratic institutions still
function, more or less, according to the same core procedures as existed
when they were created, but it is also a testament to the challenges
inherent in changing the rules by which other rules are created.
Because the processes of governance lie at the core of any democratic
government, any mistakes in developing new governance procedures
can have adverse effects on substantive law. What's more, it is difficult
to judge whether governance experiments are successful. We cannot
run a randomized controlled trial in which half of state legislatures
adopt one legislative procedure while the other half adopt another, and
even if we could, it would likely be impossible to identify criteria for
evaluating which half produced better laws. 2 Corporations can
experiment more easily with governance than legislatures, but the
incentives to do so are still limited. 3 It will rarely be possible to attribute
a corporation's success or failure to a specific governance initiative
rather than to a corporation's business model. And if a governance
initiative were provably successful, most of the benefits would flow to
copycats rather than to the original innovator.4
Yet in the past few years, there has been a flurry of
experimentation with governance. This experimentation has taken
place not in the legislature or in the boardroom but on the blockchain.
The experiments are borne of necessity. Disputes about governance
have

sometimes

led

to

"hard

forks" 5

in

blockchains

and

&

1.
See Slower than Molasses, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/slower%/o20than%/o20molasses [https://perma.cc/7ZQV-YD8C] (last visited Oct.
17, 2019) ("People have complained that the legislature is moving/working slower than molasses.").
2.
For discussions of legal experimentation, see Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 986 (2011); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of
DemocraticExperimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998).
3.
On the slow pace of corporate governance innovation, see Michael Abramowicz,
Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 154 (2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate
Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 615 (2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State
Competition in CorporateLaw, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 738 (2002).
4.
On the implications of the lack of intellectual property protection in governance, see
Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: Lessons from Patents,
Yachting and Bluebooks, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 545 (1995).
When a "hard fork" occurs in a cryptocurrency, the cryptocurrency becomes two
5.
different cryptocurrencies. The two cryptocurrencies share the same early history of transactions,
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cryptocurrencies. This occurred most notably in the case of the hard
fork of Bitcoin, the leading cryptocurrency by market capitalization,
into Bitcoin Cash, after debate about the best way to scale Bitcoin to
increase its transaction volume. 6 This hard fork left owners of bitcoins
with ownership in two competing cryptocurrencies. On one hand, the
availability of hard forks illustrates that there is a governance
mechanism native to cryptocurrencies. If a cryptocurrency's value
stems entirely from the community's belief that the cryptocurrency has
value, then that value can be subdivided into child cryptocurrencies. On
the other hand, a cryptocurrency may be more cumbersome to use and
less valuable once split into pieces, so mechanisms that avoid hard forks
may be preferable.
In principle, a blockchain, whether in the form of a
cryptocurrency or not, can use any conventional governance
mechanism.
Indeed,
many private
companies
have
created
"permissioned blockchains," 7 wholly under their control and thus
subject to change through ordinary governance procedures. But many
blockchains, particularly cryptocurrencies, are implemented through
open-source software. 8 The originator of a cryptocurrency project may
control the repository for the software code, but in a typical licensing
arrangement9 anyone else may copy the software. And even if the
software was not freely copyable, if the protocol the software
implements is publicly known, others can implement the protocol in
software of their own or borrow the best features of that software for a
competing product. Moreover, cryptocurrency projects often reflect an
anarcho-libertarian philosophy of decentralization. A blockchain is
typically the result of a decentralized process for determining which
transactions should be included on a ledger, and some may thus have

but their blockchains will reflect different transactions later in the history. See, e.g.,
Jake
Frankenfield,
Hard
Fork
(Blockchain),
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hard-fork.asp [https://perma.cc/NW95-VW4K] (last updated Oct. 2, 2019).
See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Some Bitcoin Backers Are Defecting to Create a Rival
6.
Currency, N.Y.
TIMES
(July
25,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/business/dealbook/bitcoin-cash-split.html [https://perma.cc/B2V9-LBWK].
7.
See, e.g., The Difference Between Permissionedand PermissionlessBlockchains, SEPA
FOR CORPORATES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.sepaforcorporates.com/thoughts/difference-betweenpermissioned-permissionless-blockchains/ [https://perma.cc/MBT5-F3TN].
8.
See,
e.g.,
Bitcoin
Core
Integration/Staging
Tree,
GITHUB,
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin [https://perma.cc/BA5E-AYP5] (last visited Oct. 25, 2019)
(providing the Bitcoin repository).
9.
See, e.g., bitcoinICOPYING, GITHUB, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/COPYING [https://perma.cc/3MXT-NTQX] (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) (containing the content
of the MIT license applicable to Bitcoin).
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an ideological aversion to a centralized, hierarchical governance scheme
for determining how the protocol that generates this process is defined.
Thus, the development of blockchains has led to two sources of
demand for decentralized decision-making: first, a perceived need to
coordinate developments of particular blockchains without hard forks,
and second, the view that a decentralized system should be
decentralized not only at the operational level but also at the level of
governance. In addition, the entrepreneurial cryptocurrency ecosystem
also generates interest in decentralized decision-making. When
entrepreneurs witnessed initial coin offerings based on blockchain
innovations generate tens of millions of dollars in capital,1 0 they
naturally sought to identify new potential blockchain innovations along
many dimensions, of which governance is just one. Skeptics of
cryptocurrencies may observe that cryptocurrencies are so innovative
only because they are so devoid of underlying substance. Children
playing in the schoolyard can fashion new rules for their games quickly
because the stakes are so low. But whether cryptocurrencies were or
are in a bubble, the froth has produced a great deal of thought and
experimentation with decentralized governance.
By "decentralized governance," I mean a set of rules that allow
some collective to produce discernible decisions without appointing
individuals or entities to make those decisions. A direct democracy can
represent a form of decentralized governance if there is some set of rules
for identifying who is entitled to vote and some means of counting the
votes to determine the result of the vote. Ownership of cryptocurrency
and other blockchain assets is often obscured, so there is no simple way
to implement the principle of "one person, one vote."" But some
cryptocurrencies have experimented with the principle of "one token,
one vote," through which those with greater ownership rights are given
greater decision-making power. 12 Such voting arrangements are not my

10.
See, e.g., Paul Vigna & Dave Michaels, Are ICO Tokens Securities? Startup Wants a
Judge to Decide, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 27, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/are-icotokens-securities-startup-wants-a-judge-to-decide- 11548604800
[https://perma.cc/AW4K-4SPL]
(including a list of the largest initial coin offerings in 2017).
11.
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-BasedLaw, 58 ARIz. L. REv. 359, 363
(2016) (explaining why this is difficult with cryptocurrencies).
12.
Cryptocurrencies have also experimented with variations. One interesting variation
is Dfinity, which creates a reputation network, in which the result of decisions depends on a
combination of votes and on formal trust relationships. See, e.g., Dominic Williams, The DFINITY
"Blockchain Nervous System", MEDIUM (Jan. 4, 2017), https://medium.com/dfinity/the-dfinityblockchain-nervous-system-a5ddl783288e [https://perma.cc/C8NP-K6VL].
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interest here, in part because they present a problem akin to that of
majority shareholder oppression of minority shareholders. 13
My focus in this Article is on a different approach to
decentralized governance, in which not only are there no appointed
officials but there are no votes either, at least as voting is conventionally
conceived. The approach bases decisions on an algorithm that identifies
focal resolutions of normative issues. A simple example can give the gist
of this type of mechanism, which I describe further below. Suppose that
I wish to decide whether to give a sizeable donation to the American
Cancer Society or the Save the Wolves Foundation, and I do not want
to split the donation between them. I solicit help from students in my
class. I choose students at random and ask them one at a time to state
which charity I should choose and to explain their choice. I promise to
give each student (other than the last) $1 if that student announces the
same answer as the last student I call on. I will stop calling on students
at a random point-for example, if a coin that I flip lands on heads twice
in a row. Whatever the last student says determines the charity to
which I will donate.
Assuming that each student cares only about the dollar and not
about which charity actually receives the money or about some other
factor such as personal reputation, then the student should announce
the charity that the student anticipates the last student will announce.
But because the last student will not know that she is last, she too will
be anticipating the reasoning of a later decision maker. If one knew that
the last student would choose between the charities based on which was
earlier in alphabetical order or based on some other arbitrary criterion,
every other student would have an incentive to follow that same
arbitrary criterion. But there are an infinite number of arbitrary
criteria, so the normative criterion of which charity is actually better
according to those participating in the game stands out. Thus, a student
intent on winning the dollar will likely evaluate the relative merits of
the charities, placing aside idiosyncratic beliefs. The student may then
offer an explanation of why this choice is in fact focal to improve the
odds that others conclude that the choice is a good one.
This process will always produce a clear result, in much the
same way that legislative rules can lead to a conclusive determination
of whether a bill has been enacted into law-excepting edge cases, such
as when one might argue whether a particular legislator is rightfully a
member of the body. And a blockchain is a decentralized system that
can be used to record a series of transactions, such as the charity
See generally Robert C. Art, ShareholderRights and Remedies in Close Corporations:
13.
Oppression, FiduciaryDuties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371, 372 (2003).
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preference announcements, and it is possible for one to pay out the
rewards (or collect the penalties) needed to provide participants with
the relevant incentives. Thus, using the blockchain to identify focal
resolutions of cryptocurrency-related issues may constitute one form of
blockchain governance, and its merits or demerits must ultimately be
compared with those of other forms of blockchain governance.
This Article's goal is to offer a history of this approach to
decentralized governance. I was the first person to consider the
possibility of decentralized governance systems along these lines two
decades ago, well before the advent of Bitcoin and blockchain, and so I
begin in Part II by summarizing the argument of my original article. In
the past few years, the advent of blockchain led me to return to the
topic, describing how this form of decentralized governance could be
executed on the blockchain. In fact, it turned out to be unnecessary for
me to return to the issue, as other commentators simultaneously
recognized the possibility of similar types of mechanisms. Meanwhile,
there have been experiments on similar mechanisms, both in the
laboratory and in the real world, with mixed results. I describe these in
Part III. After describing these experiments and projects, I conclude in
Part IV by offering some recommendations for future designs and
experiments.
II. DECISION-MAKING THROUGH SCHELLING POINTS
This Part provides a brief intellectual history of decentralized
blockchain governance based on the identification of "Schelling focal
points." Section II.A recounts what a Schelling point is and points out
that individuals often informally coordinate on Schelling points but
without producing quantifiable answers to normative questions. The
formal games described in Section II.B give each player incentives to
provide quantitative assessments on matters of opinion equal to the
assessments that future players will make, and the process of soliciting
such answers can thus result in an answer to the normative question
posed. Section II.C describes various approaches that can result in the
implementation of such a formal game in a cryptocurrency.
A. Informal Coordinationwith Schelling Points
The game theorist Thomas Schelling recognized the existence of
"coordination games," in which each player's outcome depends on
whether that player succeeds in making the same move as another
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player.14 To illustrate the idea, he conducted a survey, largely of New
York area residents, in which he asked each respondent what that
person would do if the respondent needed to meet someone the next day
in New York City but could not communicate a time or place. The
majority of respondents chose Grand Central Station's information
booth at noon. 15 Schelling's point was not that this was a game that the
government should encourage individuals to play but rather that
individuals in effect played such tacit coordination games in everyday
situations, such as when a couple gets lost in a department store. 16
Coordination around Schelling points occurs not just in the
department store. David Friedman has argued that Schelling point
coordination is central to social organization more broadly.17 Friedman
points out that Schelling points can serve to help resolve conflicts. In
the absence of a Schelling point, there may be an infinite number of
resolutions to a bilateral bargaining game, so "each proposal by one
player is likely to call forth a competing proposal from another, slanted
a little more in his own interest."18 But if "there is one outcome that is
seen as unique," the parties may readily agree to it rather than face
continued bargaining, because a statement that a party insists on that
resolution rather than one a small distance away becomes credible.19
Moreover, even without the possibility of enforcement, contracts can
create Schelling points. Though an unenforceable contract can always
be renegotiated, the original agreement serves as a focal point, so each
party may prefer that agreement to the alternative of continued
bargaining. 20
More ambitiously, Schelling points can be seen as the foundation
of government itself. Hans Kelsen famously argued that every legal
system has one basic norm, the grundnorm, from which the legitimacy
of all other legal norms and conclusions follow. 2 1 Acceptance of the basic
norm that the government's duly enacted rules are binding can be seen
as the result of a Schelling game. Each person accepts the law as
14.

THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-57 (1980).

15.
Id. at 55 n. 1.
16.
Id. at 54.
17.
See David Friedman, A Positive Account of Property Rights, 11 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 1
(1994).
18.
Id. at 7.
19.
Id.
20.
See id. ("In order for a Schelling point to provide a peaceful resolution to a conflict of
interest, both parties must conceptualize the alternatives in similar ways-similar enough so that
they can agree about which possible outcomes are unique, and thus attractive as potential
Schelling points.").
21.

See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Anders Wedberg

trans., 1945); Joseph Raz, Kelsen's Theory of the Basic Norm, 19 AM. J. JURIS. 94 (1974).
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binding because each person anticipates that each other person will
conclude that it is binding. The exception proves the rule: the
grundnorm can change after a revolution. 22 The revolution is successful
when it is viewed as successful or as having changed the grundnorm.
The perception of success is success, because those with power have
incentives to wield it in accordance with what they perceive as the new
grundnorm.
More generally, Schelling points can explain coordination in
contexts in which network externalities exist-that is, in which one
participant's decision to participate in some activity (the network)
heavily impacts how others make the same decision. A canonical
example of network externalities is computer operating systems. 2 3 A
user adopting an operating system often wishes to use the same one
that others will use. It turns out, the focal point is not necessarily the
operating system with the greatest market share, however, but the one
that will have the highest market share in the future.
Cryptocurrencies themselves reflect this logic. What explains
the market capitalization dominance of Bitcoin and, to a lesser degree,
of Ethereum? It cannot be that they have more features than
alternatives, because anyone can fork them at any time. It is because
they are focal, in large part because Bitcoin was the first decentralized
cryptocurrency and because Ethereum was the first to offer robust
smart contracts. Others gain market share to the extent that they
become focal-for example, by incorporating innovative features.
Meanwhile, within a particular cryptocurrency, a blockchain is
authoritative in large part as a result of a Schelling coordination game.
Anyone can fork Bitcoin with software that reflects some new principle
for determining the valid blockchain, 24 but the principle that Bitcoin
uses to identify the valid blockchain (namely, the blockchain reflecting
the greatest proof of work) is highly focal, because it was announced in
advance as a core principle. Schelling point coordination thus
determines the relative value of cryptocurrencies and also the valid
blockchain within a particular cryptocurrency. 25
22.
See N.W. Barber & Adrian Vermeule, The Exceptional Role of Courts in the
ConstitutionalOrder, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 842 (2016) (discussing the grundnorm and how
it can change).
23.
See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly Leveraging by
Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1998) (discussing the relevance of network
externalities to the Microsoft antitrust investigation).
24.
Indeed, the Bitcoin Cash fork announced new rules that thus led to the recognition of
a different blockchain.
25.

See, e.g., JOSHiUA A. KROLL ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF BITCOIN MINING, OR BITCOIN IN

THE PRESENCE OF ADVERSARIES 2 (2013), https://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2013/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9V3A-PNF3]
("Participants
must

2020]

DECENTRALIZED BLOCKCHAIN GOVERNANCE

281

B. Formal Coordinationwith Schelling Points
The use of Schelling points described above is informal: one does
not choose where to meet in a department store or how much to value a
cryptocurrency by processing numeric announcements according to
some algorithm to produce a definitive answer. But it is possible to
devise a formal game that gives participants incentives to find focal
points. The goal of a formal game can be seen as converting numeric
statements on a matter of opinion into an objective fact pursuant to
some algorithm; the game can be said to work if that objective fact
corresponds meaningfully to actual consensus opinion, even if
individuals may have incentives to manipulate the game.
Such a game might occur in a single round. John Maynard
Keynes famously described a contest in which "competitors have to pick
out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being
awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the
average preferences of the competitors as a whole." 26 Keynes's worry
that such a contest has no economic foundation is sound, but, depending
on the precise rules, it may lead each competitor to try to find a focal
point. 27 Thus, Keynes should perhaps receive credit for suggesting the
possibility of an algorithm that might give each participant an incentive
to suppress an individual opinion in favor of the perceived group
consensus, but in fact he neither explained the precise algorithm of the
competition he described nor evaluated the dynamics that would result
from implementing it. This is because Keynes was skeptical that such
a process could produce a meaningful answer. Keynes predated
Schelling, and though his example highlights intuitions about focal
points, the purpose of Keynes's argument was to express skepticism
about markets without sufficiently strong underlying fundamentals. By
implication, Keynes would be even more skeptical about an algorithm
that relied on focal points alone.
An algorithm for a single-round game is easy to devise. On a
binary issue, for example, each participant can be instructed to write
down an answer, and the participants who reach the answer preferred
by the majority can receive a bonus payment, perhaps at the expense of
those who wrote down the minority answer. A formal Schelling game,
maintain consensus (1) on the rules to determine validity of transactions, (2) on which transactions
have occurred in the system, and (3) that the currency has value.").
26.

JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND

MONEY 156 (1936).
27.
This might not be so if the contest is winner takes all, in which case "one may have an
incentive to deviate randomly from one's estimate of the consensus value." Michael Abramowicz,
Cyberadjudication,86 IOWA L. REV. 533, 545 (2001).
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however, also may occur over multiple rounds. I described variations of
28 I assumed
such an algorithm in my 2001 article Cyberadjudication.
that in each round, a single gambler would volunteer to announce a
number. The rules of the game ensure that the gambler "will always do
best by trying to predict what will happen in the next round" and "will
increase her winnings the further her own bet is from the average in
the previous round." 2 9 In principle, the game could use real money to
ensure that gamblers have strong incentives to predict what will occur
in the next round.
I then gave an example of one approach that could satisfy these
constraints. In this approach, the game is launched by auctioning a
security corresponding to some normative question (e.g., "Plaintiff in
Case X should win the lawsuit") to the highest bidder. 30 The purchaser
at this initial auction would then be required to value this security
according to some formula, such as a specification that $0 corresponds
to certainty that the plaintiff should lose and $100 corresponds to
certainty that the plaintiff should win. That valuation would entitle
anyone else to either purchase the security at that price or sell short an
identical security to the holder of the security. Someone who exercises
either option is then subject to the same rule, valuing the option and
entitling anyone else either to purchase or sell short at this price. At
any time in the game, one can translate the most recent valuation into
the corresponding resolution of the normative question. When the game
ends (and, as in hot potato or musical chairs, no one knows exactly when
that will occur), everyone is paid off based on the most recent valuation.
That is, the current holder of the security receives the amount of the
current valuation, but that valuation also determines how much the
prior participant pays or receives, and so on back to the first
participant. Anticipating this, if one participates in the game and
believes that the final price will be higher, then one's incentive is to buy
and announce a higher price; if one believes that the final price will be
lower, then one's incentive is to sell short and announce a lower price.
The greater the mispricing one observes, the greater the potential for
profit; for example, if the current valuation is $3 and one believes one
can persuade everyone else that the plaintiff is certain to win (for
example, by producing some relevant evidence), then one can earn $97
in profit by announcing a valuation of $100.
28.
See id. at 544-45.
29.
Id. at 541. I also assumed that any one gambler's funds are small relative to the funds
of those who could play the game and that the house places itself at a disadvantage as a way of
subsidizing participation in the game. Id. at 542-43. Another important assumption is that
participants do not know precisely when the game will end. Id. at 541 n. 13.
30.
Id. at 556-70.
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In this instantiation of a formal Schelling game, the forced
transaction rules are critical. They provide incentives for participants
not to value too low or too high relative to the anticipated last valuation.
Because the incentives for this last valuation are the same, at least so
long as the last valuer does not know that the game is about to end, the
game is entirely circular. But this does not mean that it is useless.
Rather, participants must value relative to a focal point.
This is not, however, the only way to structure a multiround
Schelling game. In my book Predictocracy,3 1 I described a similar
mechanism, which I called a "self-resolving prediction market." 32 A
prediction market is a securities market in which the security will be
redeemed at a price based on some event in the real world. 33 For
example, popular prediction markets are used to forecast the
probability that each candidate will be elected to a governmental
position. Some prediction markets allow participants to trade with one
another, and the most recent trading price can be translated into the
market's prediction of the underlying event. Other prediction markets
use automated "market maker mechanisms," in which participants
trade against the sponsor of the market according to predetermined
rules. 34 I defined a self-resolving prediction market as simply a
prediction market with an automated market maker whose final value
is the last transaction value at some time-to-be-determined, where the
precise time is hidden from the players. A market design that rewards
participants based on how close they are to the final price gives
participants incentives not only to identify the focal point but also to
influence it-for example, by introducing new legal or factual
arguments. 35
Placing aside the further question of whether it might be
superior in any context to centralized approaches to providing
adjudication, could a scheme like this be a viable mechanism for

31.
MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE DECISION MAKING (2008).

32.
Id. at 290-94.
33.
See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow et al., The Promise of PredictionMarkets, 320 SCIENCE
877, 877 (2008).
34.
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Hidden Beauty of the QuadraticMarket Scoring
Rule: A Uniform Liquidity Market Maker, with Variations, 1 J. PREDICTION MARKETS 111, 112
(2007).
See ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 31, at 119-26. Participants can also have incentives to
35.
produce relevant arguments if the market concludes based on some realized state of the world
(such as who wins an election), so long as the market is periodically resolved based on the current
price. See id. at 119-26; Michael Abramowicz, DeliberativeInformationMarkets for Small Groups,
in INFORMATION MARKETS: ANEW WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS 112-13 (Robert W. Hahn & Paul C.

Tetlock eds., 2006).
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conducting adjudication? The most obvious concern is that while
participants will have an incentive to look for a focal point, there is no
guarantee that the focal point that participants settle on will be the
correct resolution of the question associated with the market. A focal
point might be affected by moral considerations independent of the legal
questions posed. That is, if there is a "moral" focal point and a "legal"
focal point, participants might see the ultimate focal point as a weighted
average of these two focal points. 36 This is not necessarily a decisive
objection, however. Maybe it is desirable for moral considerations to
affect decision-making, and in any event, surely in actual adjudications,
judges' perceptions of morality-or efficiency or the optimum for any
other framework-affect their decisions. The "legal" focal point itself
may reflect a weighting of different interpretive approaches, such as
originalism and purposivism, representing different focal points.
One potential weakness of the scheme, however, is that numbers
become focal for wholly arbitrary reasons. Perhaps a number will seem
focal because it is a round number. I argued that this is unlikely because
there are many numbers that have some focal attribute-prime
numbers, well-known dates, and so forth-and so the question for
participants is why a number should be focal in a particular instance of
the game. But whether a game would be resolved by arbitrary focal
points is ultimately an empirical question. In particular, in a Schelling
game, participants and those affected by the decision may have
incentives to create new focal numbers-for example, by announcing
them loudly or by credibly committing to playing the Schelling game
and betting on those numbers themselves. Yet this strategy creates
incentives for others to push back to the original focal point. If A
announces a manipulative number, then B can return to the original
focal point in the next round. So long as each has only a small
percentage of funds available to invest in the game, the question
becomes what the broader set of participants will view as more focal.
C. Schelling Points in Cryptocurrency
When I originally described the possibility that Schelling games
might be used to perform decision-making, I assumed that these games
would occur in the context of a conventional mechanism of governance.
For example, a corporation might commit to make decisions based on
prediction markets, 37 and such a promise could be enforced through

36.
Abramowicz, supra note 27, at 549-5 1.
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, PredictionMarkets for Corporate
37.
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1346 (2007).
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ordinary contracts in ordinary courts. A prediction market itself would
be centralized, even though participants in the prediction markets
could be dispersed. In Predictocracy, I mentioned that it might be
possible "to have government decisions based entirely on decentralized
prediction markets," 38 but I did not describe how this might work. The
advent of cryptocurrencies and the blockchain, however, establishes
that at least some decisions-such as determining which ledger of
transactions is the authoritative one-can be accomplished in a wholly
decentralized way.
Figure 1. Elimination of Centralized Enforcement from
Decentralized Decision-Making Mechanism
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Schelling Game
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Thus, after the emergence of Bitcoin, I returned to my earlier
work on Schelling points, explaining how it might be possible to
implement a formal Schelling game on a decentralized cryptocurrency
not controlled by any government. 39 Schelling games and
cryptocurrencies are each designed to be decentralized, but each has a
fundamental point of centralization. The Schelling games as I
had previously described would ultimately be enforced by
government-created courts enforcing contracts, and cryptocurrencies'
38.
39.

ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 31, at 289.
See Abramowicz, supra note 11, at 363-65.

286

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 22:2:273

software code would need to be maintained in a repository by some
organization. But if a Schelling game is used to determine how a
cryptocurrency supporting smart contracts evolves, decentralization
comes full circle, with the cryptocurrency providing a platform for
ensuring that Schelling game participants receive (or pay) the
appropriate amounts and the Schelling game used to determine
whether proposed amendments to the cryptocurrency software protocol
should be accepted.
Figure 2.

Blockchain

hosts
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Schelling Game

Decision Whether
to Amend the
Bockehain

resolves
Decentralization comes full circle-namely, blockchain-enforced
Schelling games can decide the direction of the blockchain itself.
Unsurprisingly, given many cryptocurrency advocates' concerns
about cryptocurrency governance and sympathy for decentralized
decision-making approaches, I was not the only person to hit on the idea
of using formal Schelling games to make decisions on a blockchain. In
this Section, I describe several other proposals for integrating Schelling
point decision-making into the blockchain, and then I address
P + Epsilon attacks, a type of attack against Schelling point
decision-making over which some commentators have raised a concern.
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1. Autonocoin, SchellingCoin, and TruthCoin Proposals
In Cryptocurrency-Based Law, I offered an approach
considerably simpler than the "forced transaction rules" and prediction
market described above. 40 Suppose that a cryptocurrency faces a binary
decision, such as whether to approve a new checkpoint-a point that all
future versions of the blockchain must contain. A cryptocurrency could
handle this by defining a transaction that initiates the question and
then allowing holders of cryptocurrency to transfer cryptocurrency to
designated addresses corresponding to "Yes" and "No." Once a round
occurred in which there was a sufficiently low level of activity, the
winning position would be declared to be the one with more total
support. All of the currency spent would be allocated to the winners.
Earlier supporters of the winning position would receive funds before
later supporters, so participants would not be incentivized to pile onto
the winning position. I explained how this approach would give each
participant the incentive to choose a position consistent with what the
next participant would be more likely than not to do.4 1
I expanded on this mechanism in an article suggesting the
possibility of a cryptocurrency based on a concept that I termed
"proof-of-belief." 42 I named the cryptocurrency "Autonocoin" to highlight
that the cryptocurrency would be a self-governing, autonomous
decentralized entity. With Autonocoin, all governance decisions would
be made on the cryptocurrency itself. In addition to making binary
decisions, the cryptocurrency could resolve questions of how much
reward someone who contributed to the cryptocurrency should
receive-for example, by contributing software or by marketing the
cryptocurrency or adopting it for financial transactions. 43 Moreover, I
explained how Autonocoin could be used to make the decision central to
all cryptocurrencies: the determination of which is the correct
blockchain. The principle would be that the correct blockchain is the
one that has the most "proof of belief." A participant can sign
transactions indicating that the participant thinks that a blockchain is
authoritative, and other participants can sign transactions indicating

40.
See id. at 364-65.
41.
Id. at 390-95.
42.
See Michael Abramowicz, Autonocoin: A Proof-of-BeliefCryptocurrency, 1 LEDGER 119,
126 (2016).
43.
See Matan Field et al., Backfeed Protocol - The Objective Layer 1 (June 8, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), https://github.com/Backfeed/documents/blob/master/whitepaper-objective.protocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QQN-DY2C]. Another blockchain project that has recognized
the importance of providing blockchain-based rewards for contributors to the project is Backfeed.
See id.
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the reverse. Autonocoin would embody a convention that these
transactions determine which blockchain in fact is authoritative-that
is, the one with the greatest degree of committed resources-and those
who properly identify the correct blockchain earn a reward for
expressing their proof of belief, while those who endorse the wrong
blockchain lose their stakes. In general, there would likely be little
controversy about the authoritative blockchain, given the existence of
clear rules for determining which transactions a blockchain should
include, but there might be edge cases that the Autonocoin mechanism
could resolve.
At least two other commentators considered the possibility of
Schelling point mechanisms at around the same time as me-and
indeed published on the internet before the publication of my articles.
One of these was Vitalik Buterin, the creator of Ethereum, who
considered the possibility in a blog post.4 4 Buterin considered using a
Schelling game not to resolve a subjective question but an objective one,
specifically about the current value of a unit of Ether cryptocurrency in
terms of dollars. The ability to obtain this value would be useful because
it would enable hedging in smart contracts. Although the value is in
some sense objective, if a decentralized mechanism is needed for
determining the correct value, then the smart contract requires third
parties to report what they believe is the correct value; if there are
differences in the value reported, then the analysis of which is correct
is subjective. And thus, the determination of an objective value in a
decentralized way requires Schelling point decision-making as much as
the determination of a subjective value.
Buterin proposes the following mechanism: Users can submit
hashes of transactions including their estimate of the ETH-USD price
during the even-numbered block and can then cryptographically unveil
their estimates during the subsequent block.45 Once that block is

complete, the submitted and revealed values would determine the
answer, with "[e]very user who submitted a correctly submitted value
between the 25th and 7 5th percentile gain[ing] a reward of N tokens."4 6
Around the same time, Paul Sztorc proposed a similar
mechanism to accomplish the same problem of providing a means of

44.
Vitalik Buterin, SchellingCoin: A Minimal-Trust Universal Data Feed, ETHEREUM
BLOG (Mar. 28, 2014), https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/03/28/schellingcoin-a-minimal-trust-universal-data-feed/ [https://perma.cc/HQ3G-DT3T].
45.
Id. This mechanism allows users to keep their decisions anonymous during the first
round. Id.
46.
Id.
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incorporating facts about the real world into a cryptocurrency.4 7 He
suggested that the currency include, in addition to the store of value,
VoteCoins, whose ownership changes as a result of voting activity.
Vote Coins are gained by voting with the plurality on disputed decisions
and lost by not voting or voting different from the plurality.4 8 Sztorc
recommends the determination of the plurality decision using an
algorithm based on matrix algebra,4 9 and he explains why his system
gives participants the incentive to find Schelling points.50
2. The P + Epsilon Attack
In a later blog post, Buterin describes a potential attack
conceived by Andrew Miller against Schelling point coordination
schemes.5 1 Buterin considers a simple coordination game in which one
is rewarded with P coins if one votes for the same result as the majority.
An attacker, however, credibly commits-perhaps using an Ethereum
contract-to pay X, which exceeds P by a small amount Epsilon
(P+Epsilon), to each participant if (1) the participant voted the
incorrect answer, and (2) the majority voted the correct answer. Thus,
the participant will be better off voting the incorrect answer if the
majority votes the correct answer (because of the higher payment) and
will also be better off voting the incorrect answer if the majority votes
the incorrect answer (because of the baseline rules of the coordination
game). If everyone reasons along similar lines, each player will vote the
incorrect answer, thus sabotaging the game. Making the attack more
attractive is that the attacker does not need to pay the money, because
the money only needs to be paid if the majority votes for the correct
answer.
Though Buterin and Miller do not mention it, similar
mechanisms exist in the real world, as illustrated in the case of Unocal
v. Mesa Petroleum.52 Mesa offered to buy Unocal with a two-tier tender
offer. The first tier of the offer was for just over 50 percent of the
company. Shareholders successfully tendering would receive this
amount, and Mesa would then use its majority interest to effect a

47.

PAUL

SZTORC,

TRUTHCOIN:

PEER-TO-PEER

ORACLE

SYSTEM

AND

PREDICTION

MARKETPLACE
11-12
(2015),
http://www.truthcoin.info/papers/truthcoin-whitepaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G883-FPPH].
48.
Id. at 3.
49.
Id. at 13.
50.
Id. at 13-14.
51.
Vitalik Buterin, The P+Epsilon Attack, ETHEREUM BLOG (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/01/28/p-epsilon-attack/ [https://perma.cc/X2SF-QB42].
52.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949-51 (Del. 1985).
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second tier of lower value to buy out the remaining shares. A
shareholder's incentive is always to tender in this situation, regardless
of the value of the first tier relative to the current value of the first. If
the tender offer is successful-that is, at least half of the shares are
tendered-then it is better to have as many shares as possible redeemed
in the first tier. If the tender offer is not successful, then it does not
matter whether one tendered. If every shareholder reasons accordingly,
then any two-tiered tender offer will succeed, at least assuming that the
courts do not interfere with it.
But attacks can generate counterattacks, and Unocal features
one: the counter tender offer. Unocal announced that if Mesa's tender
was successful, then Unocal would buy back the rest of the stock for an
amount greater than offered in the first tier of the tender offer. 53 This
reverses the optimal strategy for shareholders by making the
alternative to tendering more attractive than tendering. If the tender
offer is successful, then it is better not to have tendered, since one will
receive more from the company. In the context of Schelling games, we
must thus ask both whether a game can be designed to prevent the
P + Epsilon attack and whether the game can be saved with
counterattacks.
Buterin considers approaches that might defeat the P + Epsilon
attack. He suggests that instead of having a single-round game, the
game might occur over multiple rounds, with round N determining the
payouts in round N- 1. "Theoretically," Buterin argues, "this requires
an attacker wishing to perform a cost-free attack to corrupt not just one
round, but also all future rounds, making the required capital deposit
that the attacker must make unbounded." But this approach is not
sufficient to prevent a P + Epsilon attack. If an attacker commits funds
to pay out once, then so long as the payouts never have to be made, the
funds will be available for each successive round. An attacker need only
have the funds available for the first round, since the beauty of the
attack, like Unocal's response to Mesa's tender, is that the money does
not actually need to be paid.
Buterin completes his counterattack as follows. Crediting
Storcz's TruthCoin, Buterin recognizes that if the amount at stake
increases with the degree of contention, then the size of the bribe
needed to corrupt successfully might have to be very high, as the
attacker would need to be able to establish enough capital to make a
payout in some future round in which the total amount at stake is
unbounded. Suppose, for example, that if there is sufficient voting on
the losing answer, then voting is simply extended to another round with
53.

Id. at 949-50.
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higher stakes, and so on forever. So long as a counterattacker
anticipates that eventually the stakes will be higher than the attacker's
payment commitment, the attack will fail in the first round, and the
attacker will need to pay out right away. Thus, for the attack to succeed,
the attacker must establish that it "is capable of pulling off a 51%
attack" 5 4-that is, that it has more money than all other participants in
the game.
Interestingly, even in a one-round game, a P + Epsilon attack
could generate a counterattack without ever increasing costs on both
sides. Suppose that the correct answer is "Yes" and that in the absence
of an attack, a voter would receive 1 for voting with the majority or -1
for voting against the plurality. The attacker promises to pay "No"
voters 2 if "Yes" wins. A counterattacker might then credibly commit to
paying "Yes" voters 2 if "No" wins. The extra incentives cancel out, and
so the ordinary logic of the Schelling game returns but with far more
voters participating, since the voters will earn a profit no matter who
wins. The attacker might then increase its offer, to protect its original
investment, but so might a counterattacker. So long as the
counterattacker can match any increased offers by the attacker, the
counterattacker should expect to win this battle (and pay out nothing)
if the underlying logic of the Schelling game is correct. This can be
profitable for the counterattacker if the counterattacker puts money on
"Yes," so a counterattacker would have a built-in advantage over an
attacker. Of course, a counterattacker might not emerge, but the mere
possibility of a counterattack means that the attack may fail and result
in a substantial payout.
The counterattacker's advantage depends on the correct
Schelling point emerging once the attacker is neutralized. One might
argue that those promoting the correct answer (the counterattackers)
are no more likely to succeed than those promoting the incorrect answer
(the attackers). But there is a strong argument that a counterattack is
likely to fail: those defending the correct answer are likely to have a
vested interest in the success of the cryptocurrency. If the
cryptocurrency is attacked successfully, especially with an attack that
ultimately costs the attacker nothing, then the Schelling game
mechanism will not be trusted, and if the cryptocurrency itself relies on
the Schelling mechanism, then the cryptocurrency itself is likely to fail.
At least, this is the likely result if such attacks were successful a
significant percentage of the time. Even if the payments from the
attacker and counterattacker are in name symmetric, they are in fact
asymmetric if a successful counterattack lowers the value of the
54.

Buterin, supra note 51.
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cryptocurrency. This provides a built-in incentive for participants to
favor the counterattacker over the attacker, and this in turn creates an
incentive for counterattackers to emerge. With Schelling games, other
counterattacks are possible. Buterin notes that participants might, via
credible commitments, agree to vote with probability just over 0.5 on
the correct answer and probability just under 0.5 on the incorrect
answer, allowing the correct answer to prevail and to still generate part
of the bribe.5 5 In any event, as Buterin seems to concede, with a
multiround game in which the stakes rise over time, no counterattack
of this sort is needed. Consider, for example, the forced transaction
rules described in Section II.B. With those rules, one will have the
incentive to force a sale or purchase of a security if one believes that the
ultimate price is more likely to be on one side of the current valuation
than the other. Similarly, with the simple rules identified in the
previous Section for Autonocoin, one will always have an incentive to
place another bet on a binary issue if one expects that one is more likely
to prevail than not if challenging the last decision. The attack will fail
if more money is placed on the correct answer than the incorrect
answer, and the ability of participants to wager more than the amount
promised by the attacker is likely to make the attack fail. A caveat is
that a genuine 51 percent attack-or perhaps even an attack by a player
with a plurality of voting shares-might succeed, but those with large
interests will generally be those least likely to want to attack the
system.5 6
III. EXPERIMENTATION WITH SCHELLING POINT DECISION-MAKING
Part II provides theoretical arguments suggesting that
participants in Schelling point coordination games are likely to seek out
the focal points corresponding to the normative questions posed, rather
than to latch onto other focal points or to give in to an attacker who
encourages others to support the wrong answer. But we must be
cautious in this conclusion. Schelling games can have multiple focal
points, and the prediction of which focal point will emerge is as
much psychology as mathematics. Thus, the fate of Schelling point

Id.
55.
56.
Indeed, this may help explain why a similar hypothetical attack is not deployed on
Bitcoin. Buterin notes that an attacker could create a Bitcoin fork with a double-spend transaction.
See id. The attacker could then promise to pay more than the typical mining reward for a miner
who successfully mines a block on the fork with the double-spend transaction, if that fork ends up
not becoming the official fork. The theory is that everyone would mine on the unofficial fork, and
the money would not need to be paid. But such an attack has never been attempted. And it is likely
that miners would ignore it because, if it worked, it ultimately would doom Bitcoin itself.
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decision-making is an empirical matter. This Part describes some
preliminary observations. To date, there have been no large-scale field
experiments with Schelling points built into a cryptocurrency, so the
ultimate answer is unclear.
A. LaboratoryExperimentation
The first piece of evidence comes from a laboratory experiment
on self-resolving prediction markets 5 7 by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij.5 8 The
experimenter recruited one thousand participants and provided them
with education about how prediction markets work.5 9 The subjects
participated in a game in which they were given incentives to predict
the proportion of black balls in an urn with black-and-white balls. Each
subject would receive information in the form of balls drawn from the
urn; in any single market run, each participant would receive a
different random selection of balls. The subjects were randomized either
to a treatment group, using self-resolving prediction markets, or to a
control group, using prediction markets that resolved based on the
actual number of black balls in the urn. The experimenters verified that
the members of the treatment group in fact understood that their
payouts would depend on later market prices, not on the number of
black balls actually in the urn.6 0
Ahlstrom-Vij assessed whether the results of the self-resolving
prediction markets were similar to those of the non-self-resolving
markets. Indeed, they were, with similar results in both volatility and
in accuracy (indeed, slightly better in accuracy though not significantly
better). 61 Ahlstrom-Vij interprets this to be evidence in favor of a "face
value hypothesis"-namely, that participants in self-resolving
prediction markets will in fact pay attention to the questions posed,
rather than to any arbitrary focal point. 62 This is, as Ahlstrom-Vij
recognizes, a tentative conclusion. Perhaps the experimental subjects,
though understanding how self-resolving markets work, did not
recognize the arbitrariness of the focal point. Or, perhaps the result
would be different if subjects were given an opportunity to communicate
with one another. Ahlstrom-Vij notes that a promising direction for
future work would be to run a similar experiment but in which some
57.
58.

See ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 31, at 290-94.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Self-Resolving Information Markets: A Comparative Study,

13 J. PREDICTION MARKETS (forthcoming 2019).

59.
60.
61.
62.

For a detailed description of the methodology, see id. (manuscript at 5-7).
Id. (manuscript at 6).
Id. (manuscript at 7, 10).
Id. (manuscript at 11).
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participants are given an external incentive to manipulate the market
and other participants know that such manipulation is possible. 63
Nonetheless, the study provides some reason to think that at least
absent efforts to move participants from the focal solution, participants
will naturally compete on the assumption that all others are looking for
the same focal point.
B. Augur
The next piece of evidence is how the Augur project resolves
internal disputes. 64 This real-world project uses Ethereum-based smart
contracts to implement and resolve prediction markets. Thus,
decentralized participants can bet on the result of events, including
political elections and sports competitions. The project includes its own
coin, REP, with a current market capitalization of over $100 million.6 5
The problem facing Augur is the same as the problem Buterin noted in
his SchellingCoin blog post. 66 The smart contracts predicting events
must be resolved based on events in the outside world, so the
decentralized system must employ some attack-resistant mechanism
for incentivizing and processing reports of what in fact happened in the
outside world.
The designers of Augur in fact do everything that they can to
resist allowing Augur to serve as a general mechanism for Schelling
games. 67 The Augur rules require the creator of a market to post a
"validity bond," which will be lost if the market turns out to be
ambiguous, in which case the market is to be resolved with a special
"invalid" answer being correct. 68 Indeed, some participants in the
project were motivated by a desire to ensure that the Augur prediction
markets were not Schelling games, which they regarded as being
indeterminate. 69 Yet the designers appear to have recognized that there
might be disputes and that no linguistic standard can eliminate all
ambiguity. For example, there might be a weak argument that a market
63.

Id. (manuscript at 12).

64.

See JACK PETERSON ET AL., AUGUR: A DECENTRALIZED ORACLE AND PREDICTION

MARKET PLATFORM 5 (2018), https://www.augur.net/whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/KFB4D7BM].
65.
Augur (REP) Coin Market Cap Is $148Million with Less than 40Active Users, BITCOIN
EXCHANGE GUIDE (Sept. 13, 2018), https://bitcoinexchangeguide.com/augur-rep-coin-market-capis-148-million-with-less-than-40-active-users/ [https://perma.cc/5M7R-S3HE].
66.
See Buterin, supra note 44.
67.
See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 1, 3.
68.
Id. at 2, 11.
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discussion
69.
nels/378030344374583298/384145958902169630 (search for "Schelling").
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has a latent ambiguity, and then the question becomes whether it is
ambiguous enough to make the "invalid" answer correct.
Thus, there will be at least some circumstances in which Augur
does need to resolve questions that ultimately involve some subjective
component. The mechanism works as follows: While the underlying
bet in Augur is of Ethereum cryptocurrency, the separate REP token
is used to encourage accurate reporting of event outcomes. In every
seven-day period, all REP holders who participate in the reporting
process by reporting outcomes receive rewards for doing so. After an
initial report is received, there occurs "a 7-day period during which any
REP holder has the opportunity to dispute the market's tentative
outcome."70 The dispute requires placing a bond against the tentative
outcome; if the sum of such bonds exceeds some threshold, then the
tentative outcome is successfully disputed. But then this resolution
itself can be successfully disputed by placing even higher bonds.
Eventually, when the dispute size exceeds some threshold, Augur goes
into a fork state, with a separate fork for each resolution. Each Augur
participant must choose a fork, and the fork that receives the greatest
number of contributions survives, and all money invested in any other
fork is forfeited.7 1
This process bears a substantial resemblance to a multiround
Schelling game, in particular to the proof-of-belief system embodied by
the Autonocoin proposal. At least in the fork round, each participant
has an incentive to place REP currency on the fork that other
participants are most likely to choose. At the same time, the Augur
design is intended to make such a fork exceedingly rare, requiring a
dispute-rare in the first place-to escalate over multiple rounds. To
date, no fork has occurred. 72 Nonetheless, all incentives in Augur are
ultimately based on the possibility of such a fork. An obviously incorrect
choice in a fork round would likely doom confidence in the Augur
project. This is unlikely, because an incorrect choice, if recognized as
such by others, would cause participants to lose money. With so much
at stake, participants have an incentive to choose the correct answer, or
the answer they think that most would think better, in the case of a

70.

PETERSON ET AL., supra note 64, at 5.

71.
The paper states a lesser penalty. See id. at 6. However, a new version of Augur
includes this provision to ensure that all participants will have an incentive to participate in the
fork. See Siamak Masnavi, An Overview ofMain FeaturesofAugur Version 2and What They Mean,
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72.
At least one software project has adapted the Augur source code, but this did not result
in a fork of REP. See Paul Fletcher-Hill, AugurLite Follow-Up, MEDIUM (May 21, 2019), https://medium.com/veil-blog/augurlite-follow-up-59fefaf240c9 [https://perma.cc/7LJS-JYQ2].
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genuinely close question. It certainly could not be manipulated using
the REP currency itself, since it would be irrational to choose an option
that would pay a theoretical attacker more of this currency if the
success of that option would simultaneously make such currency
worthless.
A mechanism designed to resolve Schelling points on subjective
questions could use the same approach. But forks might turn out to be
considerably more common, and thus a lower cost resolution is useful.
Nonetheless, any Schelling point mechanism that allows those
confident that an outcome is wrong to wager an ever-increasing amount
of money on the opposite solution should provide similar incentives. It
will be rare for disputes to involve a significant portion of the available
cryptocurrency, but the possibility of such disputes serves as a
disciplining mechanism for participants.
C. Token-Curated Registries
A final piece of evidence about Schelling games may emerge from
token-curated registries, should they attract sufficient interest. 7 3 A

token-curated registry is simply a list of entities that meet some
criterion, such as a "top colleges" list or "best tourist attractions in
Nashville" list. After initial token distribution, anyone can apply to add
an entry to a token-curated registry by depositing a token bond of a
minimum size. An existing holder of the token may then challenge the
application by putting up a counterbond. Other token holders may then
assign their tokens to either a "Yes" or "No" vote, and the side with more
total investment earns the tokens of the side with less total investment.
This is a cursory description, but the core structure should by now be
familiar. The goal is to incentivize each participant to seek the focal
point solution.7 4
Token-curated registries are in their infancy, with relatively
little at stake. One economist has offered some skepticism about the
mechanism, noting that "[t]he truth is a Schelling point but it is rarely

See Mike Goldin, Token-CuratedRegistries 1.0, MEDIUM (Sept. 14, 2017), https://me73.
dium.com/@ilovebagels/token-curated-registries- 1-0-61a232f8dac7
[https://perma.cc/77B9L9WK]; Mike Goldin, Token Curated Registries 1.1, 2.0 TCRs, New Theory, and Dev Updates,
MEDIUM (Dec. 4, 2017), https://medium.com/@ilovebagels/token-curated-registries- 1- 1-2-0-tersnew-theory-and-dev-updates-34c9f079f33d [https://perma.cc/W8YG-HWUK] [hereinafter Goldin,
Token CuratedRegistries 1.1] ("It is likely that one or more Schelling points will emerge.").
74.
Julian Martinez, Token CuratedRegistries: An Experiment in Game Theory, Part 1,
CRYPTODIGEST (Mar. 12, 2018), https://cryptodigestnews.com/token-curated-registries-an-experiment-in-game-theory-part-1-3b46a884a3f3 [https://perma.cc/JG75-SPFD].
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the only Schelling point." 75 An early token-curated registry called

Adchain seeks to identify "real publishers" as a way of distinguishing
these from publishers of fake content that seek to defraud internet
advertisers.7 6 Yet the process resulted in Facebook and the New York
Times being refused admission as a result of moral concerns among
participants. This is not necessarily inconsistent with a search for focal
points, but it seems to indicate that participants considered moral
issues separate from the goals of the registry creator. At this point,
however, the registry is quite small-consisting of a motley group of
only about one hundred publishers 7 7-and it may be difficult for a
project capitalized entirely by its own (potentially worthless) token to
generate enough interest to give participants robust incentives. If the
group were larger and the list came to be taken seriously, then
participants would have an incentive to protect their investment, likely
by making choices according to the interests of advertisers rather than
according to their own moral lights. Should a token-curated registry be
capitalized at least partly with a valuable token (such as Ethereum),
better evidence on the viability of Schelling point schemes may be
generated.
IV. RECOMIVIENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The preliminary experiments in the last Part have primarily
occurred over the past year, and thus evidence of the viability and
scalability of Schelling point decision-making is scarce. The goal of this
short symposium contribution has been to explain the logic of formal
Schelling games and explore the critiques of decision-making systems
predicated on them. A full empirical evaluation will have to wait for the
day, should it come, when significant venture capital is staked behind
some system relying on Schelling point decision-making. Whether this
occurs will depend in part on whether resolving disputes in this way
rather than through conventional approaches has value-a subject
which this short piece does not address.78
75.
Alex Tabarrok, When Can Token CuratedRegistries Actually Work?, MEDIUM (Nov. 1,
2018), https://medium.com/wireline/when-can-token-curated-registries-actually-work-%/ 0C2%/
0 B92ad908653aaf [https://perma.cc/YT6Z-K7SS].
76.
See Carlo Gutierrez, adChain Registry: Blockchain to Prevent Fraud in Digital
Advertising, ALTOROS (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.altoros.com/blog/adchain-registry-blockchainto-prevent-fraud-in-digital-advertising/ [https://perma.cc/72MR-5YSZ].
77.
See Barry Levine, MetaX Launches a Blockchain-Based Whitelist of Websites,
MARTECHTODAY (May 1, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://martechtoday.com/metax-launches-a-blockchainbased-whitelist-of-web-sites-214885 [https://perma.cc/RG7Z-553U].
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Nonetheless, the literature is sufficiently mature that I can at
least offer tentative recommendations about the design of Schelling
point decision-making. A variety of mechanisms may give parties
incentives to seek out focal point resolutions of normative questions, but
any successful mechanism must ensure that each participant makes a
bet that will pay off better if it is the same as any bet announced by
future participants. In addition, a mechanism must allow participants
to place ever-larger challenges to the current resolution, thus providing
financial incentives for third parties to study the relevant issue and to
contribute to the focal resolution. Typically, the game will proceed in
rounds, with participants in any round anticipating some probability
that attempting to move the focal point resolution will lead to a
challenge in the next round. The process may end with some probability
after each round,7 9 or continue so long as participants are willing to
charge previous assessments with higher stakes.8 0 Further
experimentation, both in the laboratory and in the real world, may
determine whether Schelling point decision-making consistently
identifies focal point resolutions and whether there are contexts in
which such decision-making may be preferable to more traditional
centralized governance.
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